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Introduction
These lectures notes were written for a summer school on Mathematics for post-quantum cryp-
tography in Thiès, Senegal. They try to provide a guide for Masters’ students to get through
the vast literature on elliptic curves, without getting lost on their way to learning isogeny based
cryptography. They are by no means a reference text on the theory of elliptic curves, nor on
cryptography; students are encouraged to complement these notes with some of the books rec-
ommended in the bibliography.
The presentation is divided in three parts, roughly corresponding to the three lectures given.
In an effort to keep the reader interested, each part alternates between the fundamental theory
of elliptic curves, and applications in cryptography. We often prefer to have the main ideas flow
smoothly, rather than having a rigorous presentation as one would have in a more classical book.
The reader will excuse us for the inaccuracies and the omissions.
Isogeny Based Cryptography is a very young field, that has only begun in the 2000s.
It has its roots in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), a somewhat older branch of public-key
cryptography that was started in the 1980s, when Miller and Koblitz first suggested to use elliptic
curves inside the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (see Section 4).
ECC only started to gain traction in the 1990s, after Schoof’s algorithm made it possible to
easily find elliptic curves of large prime order. It is nowadays a staple in public-key cryptography.
The 2000s have seen two major innovations in ECC: the rise of Pairing Based Cryptography
(PBC), epitomized by Joux’ one-round tripartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and the advent
of Isogeny based cryptography, initiated by the works of Couveignes, Teske and Rostovtsev &
Stolbunov. While PBC has attracted most of the attention during the first decade, thanks to
its revolutionary applications, isogeny based cryptography has stayed mostly discrete during
this time. It is only in the second half of the 2010 that the attention has partly shifted to
isogenies. The main reason for this is the sudden realization by the cryptographic community
of the very possibly near arrival of a general purpose quantum computer. While the capabilities
of such futuristic machine would render all of ECC and PBC suddenly worthless, isogeny based
cryptography seems to resist much better to the cryptanalytic powers of the quantum computer.
In these notes, after a review of the general theory of elliptic curves and isogenies, we will
present the most important isogeny based systems, and their cryptographic properties.
LATEX source code available at https://github.com/defeo/ema2017/.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial
4.0 International” license.
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Part I
Elliptic curves and cryptography
Throughout this part we let k be a field, and we denote by k¯ its algebraic closure. We review
the basic theory of elliptic curves, and two classic applications in cryptography. The interested
reader will find more details on elliptic curves in [66], and on their use in cryptography in [41, 31].
1 Elliptic curves
Elliptic curves are projective curves of genus 1 having a specified base point. Projective space
initially appeared through the process of adding points at infinity, as a method to understand
the geometry of projections (also known as perspective in classical painting). In modern terms,
we define projective space as the collection of all lines in affine space passing through the origin.
Definition 1 (Projective space). The projective space of dimension n, denoted by Pn or Pn(k¯),
is the set of all (n+ 1)-tuples
(x0, . . . , xn) ∈ k¯n+1
such that (x0, . . . , xn) 6= (0, . . . , 0), taken modulo the equivalence relation
(x0, . . . , xn) ∼ (y0, . . . , yn)
if and only if there exists λ ∈ k¯ such that xi = λiyi for all i.
The equivalence class of a projective point (x0, . . . , xn) is customarily denoted by (x0 : · · · :
xn). The set of the k-rational points, denoted by Pn(k), is defined as
Pn(k) = {(x0 : · · · : xn) ∈ Pn | xi ∈ k for all i} .
By fixing arbitrarily the coordinate xn = 0, we define a projective space of dimension n − 1,
which we call the space at infinity ; its points are called points at infinity.
From now on we suppose that the field k has characteristic different from 2 and 3. This has
the merit of greatly simplifying the representation of an elliptic curve. For a general definition,
see [66, Chap. III].
Definition 2 (Weierstrass equation). An elliptic curve defined over k is the locus in P2(k¯) of
an equation
Y 2Z = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3, (1)
with a, b ∈ k and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0.
The point (0 : 1 : 0) is the only point on the line Z = 0; it is called the point at infinity of
the curve.
It is customary to write Eq. (1) in affine form. By defining the coordinates x = X/Z and
y = Y/Z, we equivalently define the elliptic curve as the locus of the equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b,
plus the point at infinity O = (0 : 1 : 0).
In characteristic different from 2 and 3, we can show that any projective curve of genus 1 with
a distinguished point O is isomorphic to a Weierstrass equation by sending O onto the point at
infinity (0 : 1 : 0).
3
PQ
R
P +Q
P
R
[2]P
Figure 1: An elliptic curve defined over R, and the geometric representation of its group law.
Now, since any elliptic curve is defined by a cubic equation, Bezout’s theorem tells us that
any line in P2 intersects the curve in exactly three points, taken with multiplicity. We define a
group law by requiring that three co-linear points sum to zero.
Definition 3. Let E : y2 = x3 +ax+b be an elliptic curve. Let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2)
be two points on E different from the point at infinity, then we define a composition law ⊕ on
E as follows:
• P ⊕O = O ⊕ P = P for any point P ∈ E;
• If x1 = x2 and y1 = −y2, then P1 ⊕ P2 = O;
• Otherwise set
λ =
{
y2−y1
x2−x1 if P 6= Q,
3x21+a
2y1
if P = Q,
then the point (P1 ⊕ P2) = (x3, y3) is defined by
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2,
y3 = −λx3 − y1 + λx1.
It can be shown that the above law defines an Abelian group, thus we will simply write + for
⊕. The n-th scalar multiple of a point P will be denoted by [n]P . When E is defined over k, the
subgroup of its rational points over k is customarily denoted E(k). Figure 1 shows a graphical
depiction of the group law on an elliptic curve defined over R.
We now turn to the group structure of elliptic curves. The torsion part is easily characterized.
Proposition 4. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field k, and let m 6= 0 be an integer.
The m-torsion group of E, denoted by E[m], has the following structure:
• E[m] ' (Z/mZ)2 if the characteristic of k does not divide m;
• If p > 0 is the characteristic of k, then
E[pi] '
{
Z/piZ for any i ≥ 0, or
{O} for any i ≥ 0.
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Proof. See [66, Coro. 6.4]. For the characteristic 0 case see also next part.
For curves defined over a field of positive characteristic p, the case E[p] ' Z/pZ is called
ordinary, while the case E[p] ' {O} is called supersingular.
The free part of the group is much harder to characterize. We have some partial results for
elliptic curves over number fields.
Theorem 5 (Mordell-Weil). Let k be a number field, the group E(k) is finitely generated.
However the exact determination of the rank of E(k) is somewhat elusive: we have algorithms
to compute the rank of most elliptic curves over number fields; however, an exact formula for
such rank is the object of the Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture, one of the Clay Millenium
Prize Problems.
2 Maps between elliptic curves
Finally, we focus on maps between elliptic curves. We are mostly interested in maps that preserve
both facets of elliptic curves: as projective varieties, and as groups.
We first look into invertible algebraic maps, that is linear changes of coordinates that preserve
the Weierstrass form of the equation. Because linear maps preserve lines, it is immediate that
they also preserve the group law. It is easily verified that the only such maps take the form
(x, y) 7→ (u2x′, u3y′)
for some u ∈ k¯, thus defining an isomorphism between the curve y2 = x3 + au4x+ bu6 and the
curve (y′)2 = (x′)3 + ax′ + b. Isomorphism classes are traditionally encoded by an invariant,
which origins can be tracked back to complex analysis.
Proposition 6 (j-invariant). Let E : y2 = x3 + ax + b be an elliptic curve, and define the
j-invariant of E as
j(E) = 1728
4a3
4a3 + 27b2
.
Two curves are isomorphic over the algebraic closure k¯ if and only if they have the same j-
invariant.
Note that if two curves defined over k are isomorphic over k¯, they are so over an extension of
k of degree dividing 6. An isomorphism between two elliptic curves defined over k, that is itself
not defined over k is called a twist. Any curve has a quadratic twist, unique up to isomorphism,
obtained by taking u /∈ k such that u2 ∈ k. The two curves of j-invariant 0 and 1728 also have
cubic, sextic and quartic twists.
A surjective group morphism, not necessarily invertible, between two elliptic curves is called
an isogeny. It turns out that isogenies are algebraic maps as well.
Theorem 7. Let E,E′ be two elliptic curves, and let φ : E → E be a map between them. The
following conditions are equivalent:
1. φ is a surjective group morphism,
2. φ is a group morphism with finite kernel,
3. φ is a non-constant algebraic map of projective varieties sending the point at infinity of E
onto the point at infinity of E′.
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Proof. See [66, III, Th. 4.8].
Two curves are called isogenous if there exists an isogeny between them. We shall see in the
next part that this is an equivalence relation.
Isogenies from a curve to itself are called endomorphisms. The prototypical endomorphism
is the multiplication-by-m endomorphism defined by
[m] : P 7→ [m]P.
Its kernel is exactly the m-th torsion subgroup E[m]. For most elliptic curves, this is the end
of the story: the only endomorphisms are the scalar multiplications. We shall however see some
non-trivial endomorphisms soon.
3 Elliptic curves over finite fields
From now on we let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field k with q elements. Obviously,
the group of k-rational points is finite, thus the algebraic group E(k¯) only contains torsion
elements, and we have already characterized precisely the structure of the torsion part of E.
Curves over finite fields always have a special endomorphism.
Definition 8 (Frobenius endomorphism). Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field with q
elements, its Frobenius endomorphism, denoted by pi, is the map that sends
(X : Y : Z) 7→ (Xq : Y q : Zq).
Proposition 9. Let pi be the Frobenius endomorphism of E. Then:
• kerpi = {O};
• ker(pi − 1) = E(k).
Corollary 10 (Hasse’s theorem). Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field k with q
elements, then
|#E(k)− q − 1| ≤ 2√q.
Proof. See [66, V, Th. 1.1].
It turns out that the cardinality of E over its base field k determines its cardinality over any
finite extension of it. This is a special case of a special case of the famous Weil’s conjectures,
proven by Weil himself in 1949 for Abelian varieties, and more generally by Deligne in 1973.
Definition 11. Let V be a projective variety defined over a finite field Fq, its zeta function is
the power series
Z(V/Fq;T ) = exp
( ∞∑
n=1
#V (Fqn)
Tn
n
)
.
Theorem 12. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fq, and let #E(Fq) = q+1−a.
Then
Z(E/Fq;T ) =
1− aT + qT 2
(1− T )(1− qT ) .
Proof. See [66, V, Th. 2.4].
We conclude with a theorem that links the isogenies between two elliptic curves with their
Frobenius endomorphisms.
Theorem 13 (Sato-Tate). Two elliptic curves E,E′ defined over a finite field k are isogenous
over k if and only if #E(k) = #E′(k).
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4 Application: Diffie-Hellman key exhange
Elliptic curves are largely present in modern technology thanks to their applications in cryptog-
raphy. The simplest of these application is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, a cryptographic
protocol by which two parties communicating over a public channel can agree on a common
secret string unknown to any other party listening on the same channel.
The original protocol was invented in the 1970s by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [24],
and constitutes the first practical example of public key cryptography. The two communicating
parties are customarily called Alice and Bob, and the listening third party is represented by the
character Eve (for eavesdropper). To set up the protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a set of public
parameters:
• A large enough prime number p, such that p− 1 has a large enough prime factor;
• A multiplicative generator g ∈ Z/pZ.
Then, Alice and Bob perform the following steps:
1. Each chooses a secret integer in the interval ]0, p − 1[; call a Alice’s secret and b Bob’s
secret.
2. They respectively compute A = ga and B = gb.
3. They exchange A and B over the public channel.
4. They respectively compute the shared secret Ba = Ab = gab.
The protocol can be easily generalized by replacing the multiplicative group (Z/pZ)× with
any other cyclic group G = 〈g〉. From Eve’s point of view, she is given the knowledge of the group
G, the generator g, and Alice’s and Bob’s public data A,B ∈ G; her goal is to recover the shared
secret gab. This is mathematically possible, but not necessarily easy from a computational point
of view.
Definition 14 (Discrete logarithm). Let G be a cyclic group generated by an element g. For
any element A ∈ G, we define the discrete logarithm of A in base g, denoted logg(A), as the
unique integer in the interval [0,#G[ such that
glogg(A) = A.
It is evident that if Eve can compute discrete logarithms in G efficiently, then she can also
efficiently compute the shared secret; the converse is not known to be true in general, but it is
widely believed to be. Thus, the strength of the Diffie-Hellman protocol is entirely dependent
on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in the group G.
We know algorithms to compute discrete logarithms in a generic group G that require O(√q)
computational steps (see [41]), where q is the largest prime divisor of #G; we also know that
these algorithms are optimal for abstract cyclic groups. For this reason, G is usually chosen so
that the largest prime divisor q has size at least log2 q ≈ 256. However, the proof of optimally
does not exclude the existence of better algorithms for specific groups G. And indeed, algorithms
of complexity better than O(
√
#G) are known for the case G = (Z/pZ)× [41], thus requiring
parameters of considerably larger size to guarantee cryptographic strength.
On the contrary, no algorithms better than the generic ones are known when G is a subgroup
of E(k), where E is an elliptic curve defined over a finite field k. This has led Miller [53] and
Koblitz [43] to suggest, in the 1980s, to replace (Z/pZ)× in the Diffie-Helman protocol by the
group of rational points of an elliptic curve of (almost) prime order over a finite field. The
resulting protocol is summarized in Figure 2.
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Public parameters Finite field Fp, with log2 p ≈ 256,
Elliptic curve E/Fp, such that #E(Fp) is prime,
A generator P of E(Fp).
Alice Bob
Pick random secret 0 < a < #E(Fp) 0 < b < #E(Fp)
Compute public data A = [a]P B = [b]P
Exchange data A −→ ←− B
Compute shared secret S = [a]B S = [b]A
Figure 2: The Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curves
5 Application: Elliptic curve factoring method
A second popular use of elliptic curves in technology is for factoring large integers, a problem
that also occurs frequently in cryptography.
The earliest method for factoring integers was already known to the ancient Greeks: the
sieve of Eratosthenes finds all primes up to a given bound by crossing composite numbers out
in a table. Applying the Eratosthenes’ sieve up to
√
N finds all prime factors of a composite
number N . Examples of modern algorithms used for factoring are Pollard’s Rho algorithm and
Coppersmith’s Number Field Sieve (NFS).
In the 1980s H. Lenstra [48] introduced an algorithm for factoring that has become known
as the Elliptic Curve Method (ECM). Its complexity is between Pollard’s and Coppersmith’s
algorithms in terms of number of operations; at the same time it only requires a constant amount
of memory, and is very easy to parallelize. For these reasons, ECM is typically used to factor
integers having medium sized prime factors.
From now on we suppose that N = pq is an integer which factorization we wish to compute,
where p and q are distinct primes. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that p < q.
Lenstra’s idea has its roots in an earlier method for factoring special integers, also due to
Pollard. Pollard’s (p − 1) factoring method is especially suited for integers N = pq such that
p− 1 only has small prime factors. It is based on the isomorphism
ρ : Z/NZ→ Z/pZ× Z/qZ,
x 7→ (x mod p, x mod q)
given by the Chinese remainder theorem. The algorithm is detailed in Figure 3a. It works by
guessing a multiple e of p− 1, then taking a random element x ∈ (Z/NZ)×, to deduce a random
element y in 〈1〉⊕ (Z/qZ)×. If the guessed exponent e was correct, and if y 6= 1, the gcd of y− 1
with N yields a non-trivial factor.
The p − 1 method is very effective when the bound B is small, but its complexity grows
exponentially with B. For this reason it is only usable when p − 1 has small prime factors, a
constraint that is very unlikely to be satisfied by random primes.
Lenstra’s ECM algorithm is a straightforward generalization of the p− 1 method, where the
multiplicative groups (Z/pZ)× and (Z/qZ)× are replaced by the groups of points E(Fp) and
E(Fq) of an elliptic curve defined over Q. Now, the requirement is that #E(Fp) only has small
prime factors. This condition is also extremely rare, but now we have the freedom to try the
method many times by changing the elliptic curve.
The algorithm is summarized in Figure 3b. It features two remarkable subtleties. First, it
would feel natural to pick a random elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b by picking random a and
b, however taking a point on such curve would then require computing a square root modulo N ,
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Input: An integer N = pq,
a bound B on the largest prime factor
of p− 1;
Output: (p, q) or FAIL.
1. Set e =
∏
r prime <B r
blogr
√
Nc;
2. Pick a random 1 < x < N ;
3. Compute y = xe mod N ;
4. Compute q′ = gcd(y − 1, N);
5. if q′ 6= 1, N then
6. return N/q′, q′;
7. else
8. return FAIL.
9. end if
(a) Pollard’s (p− 1) algorithm
Input: An integer N = pq, a bound B;
Output: (p, q) or FAIL.
1. Pick random integers a,X, Y in [0, N [;
2. Compute b = Y 2 −X3 − aX mod N ;
3. Define the elliptic curve E : y2 = x3−
ax− b.
4. Define the point P = (X : Y : 1) ∈
E(Z/NZ).
5. Set e =
∏
r prime <B r
blogr
√
Nc;
6. Compute Q = [e]P = (X ′ : Y ′ : Z ′);
7. Compute q′ = gcd(Z ′, N);
8. if q′ 6= 1, N then
9. return N/q′, q′;
10. else
11. return FAIL.
12. end if
(b) Lenstra’s ECM algorithm
Figure 3: The (p− 1) and ECM factorization algorithms
a problem that is known to be has hard as factoring N . For this reason, the algorithm starts by
taking a random point, and then deduces the equation of E from it. Secondly, all computations
on coordinates happen in the projective plane over Z/NZ; however, properly speaking, projective
space cannot be defined over non-integral rings. Implicitly, E(Z/NZ) is defined as the product
group E(Fp) ⊕ E(Fq), and any attempt at inverting a non-invertible in Z/NZ will result in a
factorization of N .
Exercices
Exercice I.1. Prove Proposition 6.
Exercice I.2. Determine all the possible automorphisms of elliptic curves.
Exercice I.3. Prove Proposition 9.
Exercice I.4. Using Proposition 12, devise an algorithm to effectively compute #E(Fqn) given
#E(Fq).
Exercice I.5. Implement the ECDH key exchange in the language of your choice.
Exercice I.6 (Pohlig-Hellman algorithm). Let G be a cyclic group of order N = pq, generated
by an element g. Show how to solve discrete logarithms in G by computing two separate discrete
logarithms in the subgroups 〈gp〉 and 〈gq〉.
Exercice I.7. Implement the ECM factorization method in the language of your choice.
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C/Λ
ω2
ω1
Figure 4: A complex lattice (black dots) and its associated complex torus (grayed fundamental
domain).
Part II
Isogenies and applications
6 Elliptic curves over C
Definition 15 (Complex lattice). A complex lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup of C that contains
an R-basis.
Explicitly, a complex lattice is generated by a basis (ω1, ω2), such that ω1 6= λω2 for any
λ ∈ R, as
Λ = ω1Z+ ω2Z.
Up to exchanging ω1 and ω2, we can assume that Im(ω1/ω2) > 0; we then say that the basis has
positive orientation. A positively oriented basis is obviously not unique, though.
Proposition 16. Let Λ be a complex lattice, and let (ω1, ω2) be a positively oriented basis, then
any other positively oriented basis (ω′1, ω′2) is of the form
ω′1 = aω1 + bω2,
ω′1 = cω1 + dω2,
for some matrix
(
a b
c d
) ∈ SL2(Z).
Proof. See [67, I, Lem. 2.4].
Definition 17 (Complex torus). Let Λ be a complex lattice, the quotient C/Λ is called a complex
torus.
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ab
a+ b
a
[3]a
Figure 5: Addition (left) and scalar multiplication (right) of points in a complex torus C/Λ.
A convex set of class representatives of C/Λ is called a fundamental parallelogram. Figure 4
shows a complex lattice generated by a (positively oriented) basis (ω1, ω2), together with a
fundamental parallelogram for C/(ω1, ω2). The additive group structure of C carries over to C/Λ,
and can be graphically represented as operations on points inside a fundamental parallelogram.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.
Definition 18 (Homothetic lattices). Two complex lattices Λ and Λ′ are said to be homothetic
if there is a complex number α ∈ C× such that Λ = αΛ′.
Geometrically, applying a homothety to a lattice corresponds to zooms and rotations around
the origin. We are only interested in complex tori up to homothety; to classify them, we introduce
the Eisenstein series of weight 2k, defined as
G2k(Λ) =
∑
ω∈Λ\{0}
ω−2k.
It is customary to set
g2(Λ) = 60G4(Λ), g3(Λ) = 140G6(Λ);
when Λ is clear from the context, we simply write g2 and g3.
Theorem 19 (Modular j-invariant). The modular j-invariant is the function on complex lattices
defined by
j(Λ) = 1728
g2(Λ)
3
g2(Λ)3 − 27g3(Λ)2 .
Two lattices are homothetic if and only if they have the same modular j-invariant.
Proof. See [67, I, Th. 4.1].
It is no chance that the invariants classifying elliptic curves and complex tori look very similar.
Indeed, we can prove that the two are in one-to-one correspondence.
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Definition 20 (Weierstrass ℘ function). Let Λ be a complex lattice, the Weierstrass ℘ function
associated to Λ is the series
℘(z; Λ) =
1
z2
+
∑
ω∈Λ\{0}
(
1
(z − ω)2 −
1
ω2
)
.
Theorem 21. The Weierestrass function ℘(z; Λ) has the following properties:
1. It is an elliptic function for Λ, i.e. ℘(z) = ℘(z + ω) for all z ∈ C and ω ∈ Λ.
2. Its Laurent series around z = 0 is
℘(z) =
1
z2
+
∞∑
k=1
(2k + 1)G2k+2z
2k.
3. It satisfies the differential equation
℘′(z)2 = 4℘(z)3 − g2℘(z)− g3
for all z /∈ Λ.
4. The curve
E : y2 = 4x3 − g2x− g3
is an elliptic curve over C. The map
C/Λ→ E(C),
0 7→ (0 : 1 : 0),
z 7→ (℘(z) : ℘′(z) : 1)
is an isomorphism of Riemann surfaces and a group morphism.
Proof. See [66, VI, Th. 3.1, Th. 3.5, Prop. 3.6].
By comparing the two definitions for the j-invariants, we see that j(Λ) = j(E). So, for any
homotety class of complex tori, we have a corresponding isomorphism class of elliptic curves.
The converse is also true.
Theorem 22 (Uniformization theorem). Let a, b ∈ C be such that 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0, then there is
a unique complex lattice Λ such that g2(Λ) = −4a and g3(Λ) = −4b.
Proof. See [67, I, Coro. 4.3].
Using the correspondence between elliptic curves and complex tori, we now have a new
perspective on their group structure. Looking at complex tori, it becomes immediately evident
why the torsion part has rank 2, i.e. why E[m] ' (Z/mZ)2. This is illustrated in Figure 6a; in
the picture wee see two lattices Λ and Λ′, generated respectively by the black and the red dots.
The multiplication-by-m map corresponds then to
[m] : C/Λ→ C/Λ′,
z 7→ z mod Λ′;
and we verify that it is an endomorphism because Λ and Λ′ are homothetic.
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ab
z
3z
(a) 3-torsion group on a complex torus (red
points), with two generators a and b, and action
of the multiplication-by-3 map (blue dots).
a
b
z
φ(z)
(b) Isogeny from C/Λ (black dots) to C/Λ′ (red
dots) defined by φ(z) = z mod Λ′. The kernel
of φ is contained in (C/Λ)[3] and is generated
by a. The kernel of the dual isogeny φˆ is gen-
erated by the vector b in Λ′.
Figure 6: Maps between complex tori.
Within this new perspective, isogenies are a mild generalization of scalar multiplications.
Whenever two lattices Λ,Λ′ verify αΛ ⊂ Λ′, there is a well defined map
φα : C/Λ→ C/Λ′,
z 7→ αz mod Λ′
that is holomorphic and also a group morphism. One example of such maps is given in Figure 6a:
there, α = 1 and the red lattice strictly contains the black one; the map is simply defined as
reduction modulo Λ′. It turns out that these maps are exactly the isogenies of the corresponding
elliptic curves.
Theorem 23. Let E,E′ be elliptic curves over C, with corresponding lattices Λ,Λ′. There is a
bijection between the group of isogenies from E to E′ and the group of maps φα for all α such
that Λ ⊂ αΛ′.
Proof. See [66, VI, Th. 4.1].
Looking again at Figure 6a, we see that there is a second isogeny φˆ from Λ′ to Λ/3, which
kernel is generated by b ∈ Λ′. The composition φˆ ◦ φ is an endomorphism of C/Λ, up to the
homothety sending Λ/3 to Λ, and we verify that it corresponds to the multiplication-by-3 map.
In this example, the kernels of both φ and φˆ contain 3 elements, and we say that φ and φˆ have
degree 3. Although not immediately evident from the picture, this same construction can be
applied to any isogeny. The isogeny φˆ is called the dual of φ. Dual isogenies exist not only in
characteristic 0, but for any base field.
We finish this section by summarizing the most important algebraic properties of isogenies;
we start with a technical definition.
Definition 24 (Degree, separability). Let φ : E → E′ be an isogeny defined over a field k, and
let k(E), k(E′) be the function fields of E,E′. By composing φ with the functions of k(E′), we
obtain a subfield of k(E) that we denote by φ∗(k(E′)).
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1. The degree of φ is defined as deg φ = [k(E) : φ∗(k(E′))]; it is always finite.
2. φ is said to be separable, inseparable, or purely inseparable if the extension of function fields
is.
3. If φ is separable, then deg φ = # kerφ.
4. If φ is purely inseparable, then deg φ is a power of the characteristic of k.
5. Any isogeny can be decomposed as a product of a separable and a purely inseparable
isogeny.
Proof. See [66, II, Th. 2.4].
In practice, most of the time we will be considering separable isogenies, and we can take
deg φ = # kerφ as the definition of the degree. Notice that in this case deg φ is the size of
any fiber of φ. Separable isogenies are completely determined by their kernel, as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 25. Let E be an elliptic curve, and let G be a finite subgroup of E. There are a
unique elliptic curve E′, and a unique separable isogeny φ, such that kerφ = G and φ : E → E′.
Proof. See [66, Prop. III, 4.12].
The proposition justifies introducing the notation E/G for the image curve E′. We conclude
with a fundamental theorem on isogenies.
Theorem 26 (Dual isogeny). Let φ : E → E′ be an isogeny of degree m. There is a unique
isogeny φˆ : E′ → E such that
φˆ ◦ φ = [m]E , φ ◦ φˆ = [m]E′ .
φˆ is called the dual isogeny of φ; it has the following properties:
1. φˆ is defined over k if and only if φ is;
2. ψ̂ ◦ φ = φˆ ◦ ψˆ for any isogeny ψ : E′ → E′′;
3. ψ̂ + φ = ψˆ + φˆ for any isogeny ψ : E → E′;
4. deg φ = deg φˆ;
5. ˆˆφ = φ.
7 The endomorphism ring
We have already defined an endomorphism as an isogeny from a curve to itself. If we add the
multiplication-by-0 to it, the set of all endomorphisms of E form a ring under the operations of
addition and composition, denoted by End(E).
We have already seen that the multiplication-by-m is a different endomorphism for any integer
m, thus Z ⊂ End(E). For the case of finite fields, we have also learned about the Frobenius
endomorphism pi; so certainly Z[pi] ⊂ End(E) in this case. We shall now give a complete
characterization of the endomorphism ring for any field.
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Definition 27 (Order). Let K be a finitely generated Q-algebra. An order O ⊂ K is a subring
of K that is a finitely generated Z-module of maximal dimension.
The prototypical example of order is the ring of integers OK of a number field K, i.e., the
ring of all elements of K such that their monic minimal polynomial has coefficients in Z. It turns
out that OK is the maximal order of K, i.e., it contains any other order of K.
Definition 28 (Quaternion algebra). A quaternion algebra is an algebra of the form
K = Q+ αQ+ βQ+ αβQ,
where the generators satisfy the relations
α2, β2 ∈ Q, α2 < 0, β2 < 0, βα = −αβ.
Theorem 29 (Deuring). Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field k of characteristic p.
The ring End(E) is isomorphic to one of the following:
• Z, only if p = 0;
• An order O in a quadratic imaginary field (a number field of the form Q[√−D] for some
D > 0); in this case we say that E has complex multiplication by O;
• Only if p > 0, a maximal order in the quaternion algebra ramified at p and ∞; in this case
we say that E is supersingular.
Proof. See [66, III, Coro. 9.4] and [4].
In positive characteristic, a curve that is not supersingular is called ordinary ; it necessarily
has complex multiplication. We focus again on the finite field case; we have already seen that
Z[pi] ⊂ End(E). Now, Hasse’s theorem can be made more precise as follows.
Theorem 30. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field. Its Frobenius endomorphism
pi satisfies a quadratic equation
pi2 − tpi + q = 0,
for some |t| ≤ 2√q.
Proof. See [66, V, Th. 2.3.1].
The coefficient t in the equation is called the trace of pi. By replacing pi = 1 in the equation,
we immediately obtain the cardinality of E as #E = q+ 1− t. Now, if we let Dpi = t2 − 4q < 0,
we verify that pi ∈ Q[√Dpi]; so, at least in the ordinary case, we can affirm that
Z[pi] ⊂ End(E) ⊂ OK ,
where K = Q[
√
Dpi] is called the endomorphism algebra of E. The structure of the orders of K
is very simple in this case.
Proposition 31. Let K be a quadratic number field, and let OK be its ring of integers. Any
order O ⊂ K can be written as O = Z+ fOK for an integer f , called the conductor of O. If dK
is the discriminant of K, the discriminant of O is f2dK .
If O,O′ are two orders of discriminants f, f ′, then O ⊂ O′ if and only if f ′|f .
In our case, we can write Dpi = f2dK , with dK squarefree. Then, any order Z[pi] ⊂ O ⊂ OK
has conductor dividing f .
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8 Application: point counting
Before going more in depth into the study of the endomorphism ring, let us pause for a while
on a simpler problem. Hasse’s theorem relates the cardinality of a curve defined over a finite
field with the trace of its Frobenius endomorphism. However, it does not give us an algorithm
to compute either.
The first efficient algorithm to compute the trace of pi was proposed by Schoof in the 1980s [63].
The idea is very simple: compute the value of tpi mod ` for many small primes `, and then
reconstruct the trace using the Chinese remainder theorem. To compute tpi mod `, Schoof’s
algorithm formally constructs the group E[`], takes a generic point P ∈ E[`], and then runs a
search for the integer t such that
pi([t]P ) = [q]P + pi2(P ).
The formal computation must be carried out by computing modulo a polynomial that vanishes
on the whole E[`]; the smallest such polynomial is provided by the division polynomial ψ`.
Definition 32 (Division polynomial). Let E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b be an elliptic curve, the division
polynomials ψm are defined by the initial values
ψ1 = 1,
ψ2 = 2y
2,
ψ3 = 3x
4 + 6ax2 + 12bx− a2,
ψ4 = (2x
6 + 10ax4 + 40bx3 − 10a2x2 − 8abx− 2a3 − 16b2)2y2,
and by the recurrence
ψ2m+1 = ψm+2ψ
3
m − ψm−1ψ3m+1 for m ≥ 2,
ψ2ψ2m = (ψm+2ψ
2
m−1 − ψm−2ψ2m+1)ψm for m ≥ 3.
The m-th division polynomial ψm vanishes on E[m]; the multiplication-by-m map can be
written as
[m]P =
(
φm(P )
ψm(P )2
,
ωm(P )
ψm(P )3
)
for any point P 6= O, where φm and ωm are defined as
φm = xψ
2
m − ψm+1ψm−1,
ωm = ψ
2
m−1ψm+2 + ψm−2ψ
2
m+1.
Schoof’s algorithm runs in time polynomial in log #E(k), however it is quite slow in practice.
Among the major advances that have enabled the use of elliptic curves in cryptography are the
optimizations of Schoof’s algorithm due to Atkin and Elkies [1, 2, 25, 64, 26]. Both improvements
use a better understanding of the action of pi on E[`]. Assume that ` is different from the
characteristic, we have already seen that E[`] is a group of rank two. Hence, pi acts on E[`] like
a matrix M in GL2(Z/`Z), and its characteristic polynomial is exactly
χ(X) = X2 − tpiX + q mod `.
Now we have three possibilities:
• χ splits modulo `, as χ(X) = (X − λ)(X − µ), with λ 6= µ; we call this the Elkies case.
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• χ does not split modulo `; we call this the Atkin case;
• χ is a square modulo `.
The SEA algorithm, treats each of these cases in a slightly different way; for simplicity, we
will only sketch the Elkies case. In this case, there exists a basis 〈P,Q〉 for E[`] onto which pi
acts as a matrix M =
(
λ 0
0 µ
)
. Each of the two eigenspaces of M is the kernel of an isogeny of
degree ` from E to another curve E′. If we can determine the curve corresponding to, e.g., 〈P 〉,
then we can compute the isogeny φ : E → E/〈P 〉, and use it to formally represent the point P .
Then, λ is recovered by solving the equation
[λ]P = pi(P ),
and from it we recover tpi = λ+ q/λ mod `.
Elkies’ method is very similar to Schoof’s original way of computing tpi, however it is consid-
erably more efficient thanks to the degree of the extension rings involved. Indeed, in Schoof’s
algorithm a generic point of E[`] is represented modulo the division polynomial ψ`, which has
degree (`2 − 1)/2. In Elkies’ algorithm, instead, the formal representation of 〈P 〉 only requires
working modulo a polynomial of degree ≈ `.
The other cases have similar complexity gains. For a more detailed overview, we address the
reader to [64, 49, 26, 70].
9 Isogeny graphs
We now look at the graph structure that isogenies create on the set of j-invariants defined over
a finite field. We start with an easy generalization of the Sato-Tate theorem 13.
Theorem 33 (Sato-Tate). Two elliptic curves E,E′ defined over a finite field are isogenous if
and only if their endomorphism algebras End(E)⊗Q and End(E′)⊗Q are isomorphic.
An equivalence class of isogenous elliptic curves is called an isogeny class. In particular, we
see that it is impossible for an isogeny class to contain both ordinary and supersingular curves.
When we restrict to isogenies of a prescribed degree `, we say that two curves are `-isogenous;
by the dual isogeny theorem, this too is an equivalence relation. Remark that if E is `-isogenous
to E′, and if E′′ is isomorphic to E′, then by composition E and E′′ are also `-isogenous.
At this stage, we are only interested in elliptic curves up to isomorphism, i.e., j-invariants.
Accordingly, we say that two j-invariants are isogenous whenever their corresponding curves are.
Definition 34 (Isogeny graph). An isogeny graph is a (multi)-graph which nodes are the j-
invariants of isogenous curves, and which edges are isogenies between them.
The dual isogeny theorem guarantees that for every isogeny E → E′ there is a corresponding
isogeny E′ → E of the same degree. For this reason, isogeny graphs are usually drawn undirected.
Figure 7 shows a typical example of isogeny graph, where we restrict to isogenies of degree 3.
The classification of isogeny graphs was initiated by Mestre [52], Pizer [59, 60] and Kohel [44];
further algorithmic treatment of graphs of ordinary curves, and the now famous name of isogeny
volcanoes was subsequently given by Fouquet and Morain [29]. We start with some generalities.
Proposition 35. Let E : y2 = x3 + ax + b be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field k of
characteristic p, and let ` 6= p be a prime.
1. There are ` + 1 distinct isogenies of degree ` with domain E defined over the algebraic
closure k¯.
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End(E)
OK
Z[pi]
Figure 7: A volcano of 3-isogenies (ordinary elliptic curves, Elkies case), and the corresponding
tower of orders inside the endomorphism algebra.
2. There are 0, 1, 2 or `+ 1 isogenies of degree ` with domain E defined over k.
3. If E is ordinary, there is a unique separable isogeny of degree p with domain E; there are
none if E is supersingular.
4. The map (x, y) 7→ (xp, yp) is a purely inseparable isogeny of degree p from E to E(p) : y2 =
x3 + apx+ bp.
There are many differences between the structure of isogeny graphs of ordinary curves and
those of supersingular ones. We focus here on the ordinary case, and we leave the supersingular
one for the last part.
Proposition 36 (Horizontal and vertical isogenies). Let φ : E → E′ be an isogeny of prime
degree `, and let O,O′ be the orders corresponding to E,E′. Then, either O ⊂ O′ or O′ ⊂ O,
and one of the following is true:
• O = O′, in this case φ is said to horizontal;
• [O′ : O] = `, in this case φ is said to be ascending;
• [O : O′] = `, in this case φ is said to be descending.
Proof. See [44, Prop. 21].
Observe that vertical isogenies can only exist for primes that divide the conductor of Z[pi],
so the horizontal case is the generic one. Like we did for the SEA algorithm we can further
distinguish three cases, depending on the value of the Legendre symbol
(
D
`
)
, i.e., depending on
whether pi splits (Elkies case), is inert (Atkin case), or ramifies modulo `. All possible cases are
encoded in the following proposition.
Proposition 37. Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field k. Let O be its endomorphism
ring, f its conductor, D its discriminant, pi the Frobenius endormphism, fpi the conductor of
Z[pi]. Let ` be a prime different from the characteristic of k, then the types of degree ` isogenies
with domain E are as follows:
• If `|f and ` - (fpi/f), there is one ascending isogeny;
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• If `|f and `|(fpi/f), there is one ascending isogeny and ` descending ones;
• If ` - f and ` - (fpi/f), there are 1 +
(
D
`
)
horizontal isogenies, where
(
D
`
)
represents the
Legendre symbol;
• If ` - f there are 1 + (D` ) horizontal isogenies, plus ` − (D` ) descending isogenies only if
`|(fpi/f).
Proof. See [44, Prop. 21].
Putting the pieces together, we see that graphs of ordinary curves have a very rigid structure:
a cycle of horizontal isogenies (Elkies case), possibly reduced to one point (Atkin case), or to two
points (ramified case); and a tree of descending isogenies of height v`(fpi) (the `-adic valuation of
the conductor of pi). Such graphs are called isogeny volcanoes for obvious reasons (have a look
at Figure 7).
The action of pi on E[`], or more generally on E[`k] for k large enough, can be used to
determine even more precisely which isogenies are ascending, descending or horizontal. We will
not give details here, but see [54, 55, 37, 21].
10 Application: computing irreducible polynomials
In the applications seen in the first part, we have followed an old mantra: whenever an algorithm
relies solely on the properties of the multiplicative group F∗q , it can be generalized by replacing
F∗q with the group of points of an elliptic curve over Fq (or, eventually, a higher dimensional
Abelian variety). Typically, the generalization adds some complexity to the computation, but
comes with the advantage of having more freedom in the choice of the group size and structure.
We now present another instance of the same mantra, that is particularly remarkable in our
opinion: to the best of our knowledge, it is the first algorithm where replacing F∗q with E(Fq)
required some non-trivial work with isogenies.
Constructing irreducible polynomials of arbitrary degree over a finite field Fq is a classical
problem. A classical solution consists in picking polynomials at random, and applying an irre-
ducibility test, until an irreducible one is found. This solution is not satisfactory for at least two
reasons: it is not deterministic, and has average complexity quadratic both in the degree of the
polynomial and in log q.
For a few special cases, we have well known irreducible polynomials. For example, when d
divides q − 1, there exist α ∈ Fq such that Xd − α is irreducible. Such an α can be computed
using Hilbert’s theorem 90, or –more pragmatically, and assuming that the factorization of q− 1
is known– by taking a random element and testing that it has no d-th root in Fq. It is evident
that this algorithm relies on the fact that the multiplicative group F∗q is cyclic of order q − 1.
At this point our mantra suggests that we replace α with a point P ∈ E(Fq) that has no
`-divisor in E(Fq), for some well chosen curve E. The obvious advantage is that we now require
`|#E(Fq), thus we are no longer limited to `|(q − 1); however, what irreducible polynomial
shall we take? Intuition would suggest that we take the polynomial defining the `-divisors of
P ; however we know that the map [`] has degree `2, thus the resulting polynomial would have
degree too large, and it would not even be irreducible.
This idea was first developed by Couveignes and Lercier [17] and then slightly generalized
in [20]. Their answer to the question is to decompose the map [`] as a composition of isogenies
φˆ ◦ φ, and then take the (irreducible) polynomial vanishing on the fiber φ−1(P ).
More precisely, let Fq be a finite field, and let ` - (q−1) be odd and such that ` q+1+2√q.
Then there exists a curve E which cardinality #E(Fq) is divisible by `. The hypothesis ` - (q−1)
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guarantees that G = E[`] ∩ E(Fq) is cyclic (see Exercice II.8). Let φ be the degree ` isogeny of
kernel G, and let E′ be its image curve. Let P be a point in E′(Fq) \ [`]E′(Fq), Couveignes and
Lercier show that φ−1(P ) is an irreducible fiber, i.e., that the polynomial
f(X) =
∏
Q∈φ−1(P )
(X − x(Q))
is irreducible over Fq.
To effectively compute the polynomial f , we need one last technical ingredient: a way to
compute a representation of the isogeny φ as a rational function. This is given to us by the
famous Vélu’s formulas [76].
Proposition 38 (Vélu’s formulas). Let E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b be an elliptic curve defined over a
field k, and let G ⊂ E(k¯) be a finite subgroup. The separable isogeny φ : E → E/G, of kernel G,
can be written as
φ(P ) =
x(P ) + ∑
Q∈G\{O}
x(P +Q)− x(Q), y(P ) +
∑
Q∈G\{O}
y(P +Q)− y(Q)
 ;
and the curve E/G has equation y2 = x3 + a′x+ b′, where
a′ = a− 5
∑
Q∈G\{O}
(3x(Q)2 + a),
b′ = b− 7
∑
Q∈G\{O}
(5x(Q)3 + 3ax(Q) + b).
Proof. See [19, §8.2].
Corollary 39. Let E and G be as above. Let
h(X) =
∏
Q∈G\{O}
(X − x(Q)).
Then the isogeny φ can be expressed as
φ(X,Y ) =
(
g(X)
h(X)
, y
(
g(x)
h(x)
)′)
,
where g(X) is defined by
g(X)
h(X)
= dX − p1 − (3X2 + a)h
′(X)
h(X)
− 2(X3 + aX + b)
(
h′(X)
h(X)
)′
,
with p1 the trace of h(X) and d its degree.
Proof. See [19, §8.2].
The Couveignes-Lercier algorithm is summarized in Figure 8. What is most interesting, is
the fact that it can be immediately generalized to computing irreducible polynomials of degree
`e, by iterating the construction. Looking at the specific parameters, it is apparent that ` is an
Elkies prime for E (i.e.,
(
D
`
)
= 1), and that each isogeny φi is horizontal, thus their composition
eventually forms a cycle, the crater of a volcano.
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Input: A finite field Fq,
a prime power `e such that ` - (q − 1) and ` q;
Output: An irreducible polynomial of degree `e.
1. Take random curves E0, until one with `|#E0 is found;
2. Factor #E0;
3. for 1 ≤ i ≤ e do
4. Use Vélu’s formulas to compute a degree ` isogeny φi :
Ei−1 → Ei;
5. end for
6. Take random points P ∈ Ei(Fq) until one not in [`]Ei(Fq)
is found;
7. return The polynomial vanishing on the abscissas of φ−1i ◦
· · · ◦ φ−11 (P ).
E0 E1
E2
E3
E4
φ0
φ1
φ2φ3
φ4
Figure 8: Couveignes-Lercier algorithm to compute irreducible polynomials, and structure of the
computed isogeny cycle.
Exercices
Exercice II.1. Prove Lemma 16.
Exercice II.2. Prove that y divides the m-th division polynomial ψm if and only if m is even,
and that no division polynomial is divisible by y2.
Exercice II.3. Using the Sato-Tate theorem 33, prove that two curves are isogenous if and only
if they have the same number of points.
Exercice II.4. Prove Propostion 35.
Exercice II.5. Prove that the dual of a horizontal isogeny is horizontal, and that the dual of a
descending isogeny is ascending.
Exercice II.6. Prove that the height of a volcano of `-isogenies is v`(fpi), the `-adic valuation
of the Frobenius endomorphism.
Exercice II.7. Let X2 − tX − q be the minimal polynomial of pi, and suppose that it splits
as (X − λ)(X − µ) in Z` (the ring of `-adic integers). Prove that the volcano of ` isogenies has
height v`(λ− µ).
Exercice II.8. Prove that E[`] ⊂ E(Fq) implies `|(q − 1).
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Part III
Cryptography from isogeny graphs
11 Expander graphs
When we talk about Isogeny Based Cryptography, as a topic distinct from Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography, we usually mean algorithms and protocols that rely fundamentally on the structure of
large isogeny graphs. The cryptographically interesting properties of these graphs are usually
tied to their expansion properties.
We recall some basic concepts of graph theory; for simplicity, we will restrict to undirected
graphs. An undirected graph G is a pair (V,E) where V is a finite set of vertices and E ⊂ V ×V
is a set of unordered pairs called edges. Two vertices v, v′ are said to be connected by an edge
if {v, v′} ∈ E. The neighbors of a vertex v are the vertices of V connected to it by an edge.
A path between two vertices v, v′ is a sequence of vertices v → v1 → · · · → v′ such that each
vertex is connected to the next by an edge. The distance between two vertices is the length of
the shortest path between them; if there is no such path, the vertices are said to be at infinite
distance. A graph is called connected if any two vertices have a path connecting them; it is
called disconnected otherwise. The diameter of a connected graph is the largest of all distances
between its vertices. The degree of a vertex is the number of edges pointing to (or from) it; a
graph where every edge has degree k is called k-regular. The adjacency matrix of a graph G
with vertex set V = {v1, . . . , vn} and edge set E, is the n× n matrix where the (i, j)-th entry is
1 if there is an edge between vi and vj , and 0 otherwise. Because our graphs are undirected, the
adjacency matrix is symmetric, thus it has n real eigenvalues
λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λn.
It is convenient to identify functions on V with vectors in Rn, and therefore also think of the
adjacency matrix as a self-adjoint operator on L2(V ). Then can we immediately bound the
eigenvalues of G.
Proposition 40. If G is a k-regular graph, then its largest and smallest eigenvalues λ1, λn
satisfy
k = λ1 ≥ λn ≥ −k.
Proof. See [72, Lem. 2].
Definition 41 (Expander graph). Let ε > 0 and k ≥ 1. A k-regular graph is called a (one-sided)
ε-expander if
λ2 ≤ (1− ε)k;
and a two-sided ε-expander if it also satisfies
λn ≥ −(1− ε)k.
A sequence Gi = (Vi, Ei) of k-regular graphs with #Vi → ∞ is said to be a one-sided (resp.
two-sided) expander family if there is an ε > 0 such that Gi is a one-sided (resp. two-sided)
ε-expander for all sufficiently large i.
Theorem 42 (Ramanujan graph). Let k ≥ 1, and let Gi be a sequence of k-regular graphs.
Then
max(|λ2|, |λn|) ≥ 2
√
k − 1− o(1),
as n→∞. A graph such that |λi| ≤ 2
√
k − 1 for any λi except λ1 is called a Ramanujan graph.
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The spectral definition of expansion is very practical to work with, but gives very little
intuition on the topological properties of the graph. Edge expansion quantifies how well subsets
of vertices are connected to the whole graph, or, said otherwise, how far the graph is from being
disconnected.
Definition 43 (Edge expansion). Let F ⊂ V be a subset of the vertices of G. The boundary
of F , denoted by ∂F ⊂ E, is the subset of the edges of G that go from F to V \ F . The edge
expansion ratio of G, denoted by h(G) is the quantity
h(G) = min
F⊂V,
#F≤#V/2
#∂F
#F
.
Note that h(G) = 0 if and only if G is disconnected. Edge expansion is strongly tied to
spectral expansion, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 44 (Discrete Cheeger inequality). Let G be a k-regular one-sided ε-expander, then
ε
2
k ≤ h(G) ≤
√
2εk.
Expander families of graphs have many applications in theoretical computer science, thanks
to their pseudo-randomness properties: they are useful to construct pseudo-random number
generators, error-correcting codes, probabilistic checkable proofs, and, most interesting to us,
cryptographic primitives. Qualitatively, we can describe them as having short diameter and
rapidly mixing walks.
Proposition 45. Let G be a k-regular one sided ε-expander. for any vertex v and any radius
r > 0, let B(v, r) be the ball of vertices at distance at most r from v. Then, there is a constant
c > 0, depending only on k and ε, such that
#B(v, r) ≥ min((1 + c)r,#V ).
In particular, this shows that the diameter of an expander is bounded by O(log n), where the
constant depends only on k and ε. A random walk of length i is a path v1 → · · · → vi, defined
by the random process that selects vi uniformly at random among the neighbors of vi−1. Loosely
speaking, the next proposition says that, in an expander graph, random walks of length close to
its diameter terminate on any vertex with probability close to uniform.
Proposition 46 (Mixing theorem). Let G = (V,E) be a k-regular two-sided ε-expander. Let
F ⊂ V be any subset of the vertices of G, and let v be any vertex in V . Then a random walk of
length at least
log #F 1/2/2#V
log(1− ε)
starting from v will land in F with probability at least #F/2#V .
Proof. See [39].
The length in the previous proposition is also called the mixing length of the expander graph.
We conclude this section with two results on expansion in graphs of isogenies.
Theorem 47 (Supersingular graphs are Ramanujan). Let p, ` be distinct primes, then
1. All supersingular j-invariants of curves in F¯p are defined in Fp2 ;
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2. There are
b p
12
c+

0 if p = 1 mod 12
1 if p = 5, 7 mod 12
2 if p = 11 mod 12
isomorphism classes of supersingular elliptic curves over F¯p;
3. The graph of supersingular curves in F¯p with `-isogenies is connected, ` + 1 regular, and
has the Ramanujan property.
Proof. See [66, V, Th. 4.1], [59, 60], [8].
Theorem 48 (Graphs of horizontal isogenies are expanders). Let Fq be a finite field and let
O ⊂ Q[√−D] be an order in a quadratic imaginary field. Let G be the graph which vertices
are elliptic curves over Fq with complex multiplication by O, and which edges are (horizontal)
isogenies of prime degree bounded by (log q)2+δ for some fixed δ > 0. Assume that G is non-
empty. Then, under the generalized Riemann hypothesis, G is a regular graph and there exists
an ε, independent of O and q, such that G is a one-sided ε-expander.
Proof. See [39].
12 Isogeny graphs in cryptanalysis
Besides the applications to point counting mentioned in the previous part, the first application
of isogenies in cryptography has been to study the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem
in elliptic curves. One can state several computational problems related to isogenies, both easy
and hard ones. Here are some examples.
Problem 1 (Isogeny computation). Given an elliptic curve E with Frobenius endomorphism pi,
and a subgroup G ⊂ E such that pi(G) = G, compute the rational fractions and the image curve
of the separable isogeny φ of kernel G.
Vélu’s formulas (Proposition 38) give a solution to this problem in O˜(#G) operations over
the field of definition of E. This is nearly optimal, given that the output has size O(#G).
However in some special instances, e.g., when φ is a composition of many small degree isoge-
nies, the rational fractions may be represented more compactly, and the cost may become only
logarithmic in #G.
Problem 2 (Explicit isogeny). Given two elliptic curves E,E′ over a finite field, isogenous of
known degree d, find an isogeny φ : E → E′ of degree d.
Remark that, up to automorphisms, the isogeny φ is typically unique. Elkies was the first
to formulate the problem and give an algorithm [25, 26] with complexity O(d3) in general, and
O˜(d) in the special context of the SEA algorithm [7, 50]. Alternate algorithms, with complexity
O(d2) in general, are due to Couveignes and others [13, 14, 15, 23, 21].
Problem 3 (Isogeny path). Given two elliptic curves E,E′ over a finite field k, such that
#E = #E′, find an isogeny φ : E → E′ of smooth degree.
This problem, and variations thereof, is the one that occurs most in isogeny based cryptog-
raphy. It is a notoriously difficult problem, for which only algorithms exponential in log #E are
known in general. A general strategy to tackle it is by a meet in the middle random walk [30]:
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E E′weak curve strong curve
E′′
Figure 9: The meet in the middle attack in weak isogeny classes.
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ji = H(010101)
Figure 10: Hashing the string 010101 using an expander graph
choose an expander graph G containing both E and E′, and start a random walk from each
curve. By the birthday paradox, the two walks are expected to meet after roughly O(
√
#G)
steps; when a collision is detected, the composition of the walks yields the desired isogeny.
The meet in the middle strategy was notoriously used to extend the power of the GHS attack
on elliptic curves defined over extension fields of composite degree [35, 32]. Without going into
the details of the GHS attacks, one of its remarkable properties is that only a small fraction of a
given isogeny class is vulnerable to it. Finding an isogeny from an immune curve to a weak curve
allows the attacker to map the discrete logarithm problem from one to the other. The average size
of an isogeny class of ordinary elliptic curves is O(
√
#E), thus the meet in the middle strategy
yields an O(#E1/4) attack on any curve in the class: better than a generic attack on the discrete
logarithm problem. The attack is pictured in Figure 9.
Similar ideas have been used to construct key escrow systems [73], and to prove random
reducibility of discrete logarithms inside some isogeny classes [39].
13 Provably secure hash functions
The next application of isogeny graphs is constructing provably secure hash functions. The mixing
properties of expander graphs make them very good pseudo-random generators. For the very
same reason, they can also be used to define hash functions. The Charles-Goren-Lauter (CGL)
construction [8] chooses an arbitrary start vertex j0 in an expander graph, then takes a random
walk (without backtracking) according to the string to be hashed, and outputs the arrival vertex.
To fix notation, let’s assume that the graph is 3-regular, then the value to be hashed is encoded
as a binary string. At each step one bit is read from the string, and its value is used to choose
an edge from the current vertex to the next one, avoiding the one edge that goes back. The
way an edge is chosen according to the read bit need only be deterministic, but can be otherwise
arbitrary (e.g., determined by some lexicographic ordering). The process is pictured in Figure 10.
For the process to be a good pseudo-random function, the walks need to be longer than the
mixing length of the graph. However this is not enough to guarantee a cryptographically strong
hash function. Indeed the two main properties of cryptographic hash functions, translate in this
setting as the following computational problems.
Problem 4 (Preimage resistance). Given a vertex j in the graph, find a path from the start
vertex j0 to j.
Problem 5 (Collision resistance). Find a non-trivial loop (i.e., one that does not track back-
wards) from j0 to itself.
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Charles, Goren and Lauter suggested two types of expander graphs to be used in their con-
structions. One is based on Cayley graphs, and was broken shortly afterwards [75, 58]. The
second one is based on graphs of supersingular curves. In this context, the preimage finding
problem is an instance of the isogeny path problem, while the collision finding problem is equiva-
lent to computing a non-trivial endomorphism of the start curve j0. In this sense, the CGL hash
function on expander graphs has provable security, meaning that its cryptographic strength can
be provably reduced to well defined mathematical problems thought to be hard.
Nevertheless, the CGL hash function has failed to attract the interest of practitioners. For
one, it is considerably slower than popular hash functions such as those standardized by NIST.
More worryingly, some weaknesses have recently been highlighted [45, 57], that could potentially
lead to backdoors in standardized parameters.
14 Post-quantum key exchange
We come to the last, more powerful constructions based on isogeny graphs. We present here
two key exchange protocols, similar in spirit to the Diffie-Hellman protocol discussed in the
first part. Both protocols are significantly less efficient than ECDH, however they are relevant
because of their conjectured quantum security. In recent years, the case has been made that
cryptographic standards must be amended, in view of the potential threat of general purpose
quantum computers becoming available. It is well known, indeed, that Shor’s algorithm [65] would
solve the factorization and the discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time on a quantum
computer, thus sealing the fate of RSA, ECDH, and any other protocol based on them. For this
reason, the cryptographic community is actively seeking cryptographic primitives that would not
break in polynomial time on quantum computers.
Both protocols are based on random walks in an isogeny graph. The two participants, Alice
and Bob, start from the same common curve E0, and take a (secret) random walk to some curves
EA, EB . After publishing their respective curves, Alice starts a new walk from EB , while Bob
starts from EA. By repeating the “same” secret steps, they both eventually arrive on a shared
secret curve ES , only known to them. While the idea may seem simple, its realization is far
from easy. Indeed, as opposed to the hash function case, we cannot be content with an arbitrary
labeling of the graph edges. We must instead use the algebraic properties of the isogeny graphs
to ensure that Alice and Bob’s walks “commute”.
14.1 Hard homogeneous spaces
The first protocol originates in a preprint by Couveignes [16], but was only later put into practice
and popularized by Rostovtsev and Stolbunov [62, 68]. It uses random walks in graphs of ordinary
curves with horizontal isogenies; in this sense, it is a direct application of Theorem 48. The
protocol can be viewed as a special instance of a general construction on Schreier graphs, a
generalization of Cayley graphs.
Definition 49 (Schreier graph). Let G be a group acting freely on a set X, in the sense that
there is a map
G×X → X
(σ, x) 7→ σ · x
such that σ · x = x if and only if σ = 1, and σ · (τ · x) = (στ) · x, for all σ, τ ∈ G and x ∈ X. Let
S ⊂ G be a symmetric subset, i.e. one not containing 1 and closed under inversion. The Schreier
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x 7→ x5
Figure 11: Schreier graph of the generators of a group of order 13 under the action of S =
{2, 3, 5, 2−1, 3−1, 5−1} ⊂ (Z/13Z)×.
graph of (S,X) is the graph which vertices are the elements of X, and such that x, x′ ∈ X are
connected by an edge if and only if σ · x = x′ for some σ ∈ S.
Because of the constraints on the group action and the set S, Schreier graphs are undirected
and regular, and they usually make good expanders (see exercise III.2). Note that Cayley graphs
are the Schreier graphs of the (left) action of a group on itself.
As an example, take a cyclic group G of order n, then (Z/nZ)× acts naturally on G by the
law σ · g = gσ for any g ∈ G and σ ∈ (Z/nZ)×. This action is not free on G, but it is so on
the subset P of all generators of G; we can thus build the Schreier graph (S, P ), where S is a
symmetric subset that generates (Z/nZ)×. An example of such graph for the case n = 13 is
shown in Figure 11, where the set S ⊂ (Z/13Z)× has been chosen to contain 2, 3, 5 and their
inverses.
By slightly generalizing Couveignes’ work [16], we will now show how to construct a key
exchange protocol based on this family of Schreier graphs. We will restrict to cyclic groups
of prime order p, and we will have the cryptosystem security grow exponentially in log p. Let
G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of order p; let D ⊂ (Z/pZ)× be a generating set such that σ ∈ D
implies σ−1 /∈ D; and let S = D ∪ D−1. We call directed route a sequence of elements of D.
A directed route ρ ∈ D∗, together with a starting vertex g ∈ G, defines a walk in the Schreier
graph (S,G) by starting in g, and successively taking the edges corresponding to the labels in ρ.
If ρ is a directed route, and g ∈ G, we write ρ(g) for vertex where the walk defined by ρ and g
ends. We can now define a key exchange protocol where the secrets are random directed routes,
and the public data are vertices of the Schreier graph. The protocol is summarized in Figure 12.
A graphical example of this protocol with p = 13 and D = {2, 3, 5} is given in Figure 13. To
understand why it works, observe that if ρ is a route of length m
ρ = (σ1, . . . , σm),
then
ρ(g) = expg
(∏
σi
)
for any g ∈ G. Hence, the order of the steps in a route does not matter: what counts is only
how many times each element of D appears in ρ. We immediately realize that this protocol is
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Public parameters A group G of prime order p,
A generating set D ⊂ (Z/pZ)× such that σ ∈ D ⇒ σ−1 /∈ D,
A generator g of G.
Alice Bob
Pick random secret ρA ∈ D∗ ρB ∈ D∗
Compute public data gA = ρA(g) gB = ρB(g)
Exchange data gA −→ ←− gB
Compute shared secret gAB = ρA(gB) gAB = ρB(gA)
Figure 12: Key exchange protocol based on random walks in a Schreier graph.
g
gA
gAB
ggB
gAB
Figure 13: Example of key exchange on the Schreier graph of Figure 11. Alice’s route is repre-
sented by continuous lines, Bob’s route by dashed lines. On the left, Bob computes the shared
secret starting from Alice’s public data. On the right, Alice does the analogous computation.
nothing else than the classical Diffie-Hellman protocol on the group G, presented in a twisted
way.1
For this protocol to have the same security as the original Diffie-Helman, we need the public
keys gA, gB to be (almost) uniformly distributed. Hence, we shall require that the graph is an
expander, and that walks are longer than the mixing length; i.e., that D generates (Z/pZ)×,
and that walks have length ∼ log p. Since a secret route is simply defined by the number of
times each element of D is present, we shall also need #D ∼ log p/ loglog p in order to have a
large enough key space. If we respect all these constraints, we end up with a protocol that is
essentially equivalent to the original Diffie-Hellman, only less efficient.
It is now an easy exercise to generalize to other Schreier graphs. To see how this applies to
isogeny graphs, we must take a step back, and define some more objects related to elliptic curves.
Definition 50 (Fractional ideal). Let O be an order in a number field K. A fractional ideal of
O is a non-zero subgroup I ⊂ K such that
• xI ⊂ I for all x ∈ O, and
• there exists a non-zero x ∈ O such that xI ⊂ O.
A fractional ideal is called principal if it is of the form xO for some x ∈ K.
1A minor difference lies in the fact that this protocol avoids non-primitive elements of G, whereas the classical
Diffie-Hellman protocol may well use public keys belonging to a subgroup of G.
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Note that the ideals of O are exactly the fractional ideals contained in O; however, from
now on we will simply call ideals the fraction ideals, and we will use the name integral ideal for
ordinary ones. An ideal I is said to be invertible if there is another ideal J such that IJ = O.
Invertible ideals form an Abelian group, written multiplicatively, under the operation
IJ = {xy | x ∈ I, y ∈ J}.
It is easily verified that O is the neutral element of the group, and that principal ideals form a
subgroup of it.
Proposition 51 (Ideal class group). Let O be an order in a number field K. Let I(O) be its
group of invertible ideals, and P(O) the subgroup of principal ideals. The (ideal) class group of
O is the quotient
Cl(O) = I(O)/P(O).
It is a finite Abelian group. Its order, denoted by h(O), is called the class number of O.
The class group is a fundamental object in the study of number fields and their Galois theory.
What is relevant to us, is the fact that the elements of Cl(O) are represented by horizontal
isogenies, a fact that is developed in the theory of complex multiplication. We only take here a
small peek at the theory; see [47, 67, 18] for a detailed account.
Definition 52 (a-torsion). Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fq. Let O be
the endomorphism ring of E, and let a ⊂ O be an integral invertible ideal of norm coprime to q.
We define the a-torsion subgroup of E as
E[a] = {P ∈ E | α(P ) = 0 for all α ∈ a}.
Given an ideal a ⊂ O as above, it is natural to define the (separable) isogeny φa : E → Ea,
where Ea = E/E[a]. This definition can be readily extended to inseparable isogenies. Since a is
invertible, we can show that End(E) ' End(Ea) ' O, that Ea only depends on the class of a
in Cl(O), and that the map (a, E) 7→ Ea defines a group action of Cl(O) on the set of elliptic
curves with complex multiplication by O.
Theorem 53. Let Fq be a finite field, and let O ⊂ Q[
√−D] be an order in a quadratic imaginary
field. Denote by Ellq(O) the set of elliptic curves defined over Fq with complex multiplication by
O.
Assume that Ellq(O) is non-empty, then the class group Cl(O) acts freely and transitively
on it; i.e., there is a map
Cl(O)× Ellq(O)→ Ellq(O)
(a, E) 7→ a · E
such that a · (b · E) = (ab) · E for all a, b ∈ Cl(O) and E ∈ Ellq(O), and such that for any
E,E′ ∈ Ellq(O) there is a unique a ∈ Cl(O) such that E′ = a · E.
A set that is acted upon freely and transitively by a group G, is also called a principal
homogeneous space or a torsor for G. An immediate consequence of the theorem above is that
the torsor Ellq(O) has cardinality equal to the class number h(O).
Following on from the connection between isogenies and ideals, suppose that that `O splits
into prime ideals as `O = l¯l. Set S = {l, l¯}, then the Schreier graph of (S,Ellq(O)) is exactly the
graph of horizontal `-isogenies on Ellq(O). More generally, if we let S ⊂ Cl(O) be a symmetric
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subset, its Schreier graph is a graph of horizontal isogenies, and it is an expander if and only if
S generates Cl(O).
Based on this observation, we can now give a key exchange protocol based on random walks
in graphs of horizontal isogenies. The general idea was already present in Couveignes’ work [16],
but it was Rostovtsev and Stolbunov who proposed to use isogeny computations to effectively
implement the protocol [62, 68].
The protocol implicitly uses the set Ellq(O) of elliptic curves over Fq with complex multiplica-
tion by some order O; however it never explicitly computes O. Instead, it determines parameters
in the following order:
1. A large enough finite field Fq;
2. A curve E defined over Fq;
3. The Frobenius discriminant Dpi = t2pi − 4q of E is computed through point counting, and
it is verified that it contains a large enough prime factor;
4. A set L = {`1, . . . , `m} of primes that split in Z[pi], i.e., such that
(
Dpi
`i
)
= 1;
5. For each prime `i, the factorization
pi2 − tpipi + q = (pi − λi)(pi − µi) mod `i
is computed, and one of the roots, say λi, is chosen arbitrarily as positive direction.
The condition on the `i’s guarantees that each graph of `i-isogenies on Ellq(O) is 2-regular.
The choice of a positive direction allows us to orient the graph, by associating to λi the isogeny
with kernel E[`i]∩ ker(pi− λi). The key exchange now proceeds like the ordinary Diffie-Hellman
protocol:
1. Alice chooses a random walk made of steps in L along the positive direction; denote the
walk by ρA ∈ L∗, and denote by EA = ρA(E) the curve where the walk terminates. Note
that EA only depends on how many times each `i appears in ρA, and not on their order.
2. Bob does the same, choosing a random walk ρB and computing EB = ρB(E).
3. Alice and Bob exchange EA and EB .
4. Alice computes the shared secret ρA(EB).
5. Bob computes the shared secret ρB(EA).
The actual computations are carried out by solving explicit isogeny problems (see Problem 2), in
much the same way they are done in the Elkies case of the SEA algorithm (see Section 8). The
protocol is summarized in Figure 14.
We conclude this section with a discussion on the security of the Rostovtsev-Stolbunov pro-
tocol. All the protocol’s security rests on the isogeny path problem: given E and EA, find an
isogeny φ : E → EA of smooth order. To be safe against exhaustive search and meet in the
middle attacks as seen in Section 12, the set Ellq(O) must be large. On average # Ellq(O) ∼ √q,
thus we shall take log2 q ≈ 512 for a security level of at most 128 bits. However, some isogeny
classes are much smaller than average, this is why we also need check that Dpi has a large prime
factor.
Furthermore, for the public and private curves to be (almost) uniformly distributed in Ellq(O),
we need the isogeny graph to be connected; equivalently, we need the ideals (`i, pi−λi) to generate
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Public parameters An elliptic curve E over a finite field Fq,
Dpi, the discriminant of the Frobenius endomorphism of E,
A set of primes L = {`1, . . . , `m} such that
(
Dpi
`i
)
= 1,
A Frobenius eigenvalue λi for each `i,
Alice Bob
Pick random secret ρA ∈ L∗ ρB ∈ L∗
Compute public data EA = ρA(E) EB = ρB(E)
Exchange data EA −→ ←− EB
Compute shared secret EAB = ρA(EB) EAB = ρB(EA)
Figure 14: Rostovtsev-Stolbunov key exchange protocol based on random walks in an isogeny
graph.
Cl(O). Theorem 48 ensures this is the case if #L ∼ (log q)2, however it is usually sufficient
to take a much smaller set in practice. It is not enough to have an expander: we also need
the random walks to be longer than the mixing length, that is ∼ log q. And, since the key
space grows exponentially with #L, rather than with the walk length, we shall also ask that
#L ∼ log q/ loglog q.
When all conditions are met, the best known attack against this cryptosystem is the meet in
the middle strategy, which runs in O( 4√q) steps. However, the real case for this system is made by
looking at attacks performed on a quantum computer. It is well known that Shor’s algorithm [65]
breaks the Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem in polynomial time on a quantum computer, and thus it
also breaks the protocol of Figure 12. More generally, Shor’s algorithm can solve the (generalized)
discrete logarithm problem in any Abelian group, and in particular in Cl(O). However, in the
Rostovtsev-Stolbunov protocol, the attacker only sees E, EA and EB . Since there is no canonical
way to map the curves to elements of Cl(O), it is not enough to be able to solve discrete logarithms
in it.
Childs, Jao and Soukharev [9] have shown how to adapt quantum algorithms by Regev [61]
and Kuperberg [46] to solve the ordinary isogeny path problem in subexponential time. Although
their attack does not qualify as a total break, it makes the Rostovtsev-Stolbunov protocol even
less practical. Indeed, the protocol is already very slow, mainly due to the relatively large size of
the isogeny degree set L. If parameter sizes must be further enlarged to protect against quantum
attacks, it seems plausible that the Rostovtsev-Stolbunov protocol may never be used in practice.
14.2 Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman
We finally come to the last cryptographic construction from isogeny graphs. Compared to the
ordinary case, graphs of supersingular isogenies have two attractive features for constructing
key exchange protocols. First, one isogeny degree is sufficient to obtain an expander graph; by
choosing one small prime degree, we have the opportunity to construct more efficient protocols.
Second, there is no action of an Abelian group, such as Cl(O), on them; it thus seems harder to
use quantum computers to speed up the supersingular isogeny path problem.
But the absence of a group action also makes it impossible to directly generalize the Rostovtsev-
Stolbunov protocol to supersingular graphs. It turns out, however, that there is an algebraic
structure acting on supersingular graphs. We have seen that, if E is a supersingular curve defined
over Fp or Fp2 , its endomorphism ring is isomorphic to an order in the quaternion algebra Qp,∞
ramified at p and at infinity. There is more: supersingular curves are in correspondence with the
maximal orders of Qp,∞, and their left ideals act on the graph like isogenies. It would be rather
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Figure 15: Supersingular isogeny graphs of degree 2 (left, blue) and 3 (right, red) on F972 .
kerα = 〈A〉 ⊂ E[`eAA ]
kerβ = 〈B〉 ⊂ E[`eBB ]
kerα′ = 〈β(A)〉
kerβ′ = 〈α(B)〉
E E/〈A〉
E/〈B〉 E/〈A,B〉
α
α′
β β′
Figure 16: Commutative isogeny diagram constructed from Alice’s and Bob’s secrets. Quantities
known to Alice are drawn in blue, those known to Bob are drawn in red.
technical to go into the details of the theory of quaternion algebras and their maximal orders; in-
stead, we describe the key exchange protocol using only the language of isogenies, with the caveat
that its security can only be properly evaluated by also looking at its quaternion counterpart.
The interested reader will find more details on quaternion algebras in [77, 59, 60, 44, 4, 45].
The key idea of the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman protocol (SIDH), first proposed
in [38], is to let Alice and Bob take random walks in two distinct isogeny graphs on the same
vertex set. In practice, we choose a large enough prime p, and two small primes `A and `B . The
vertex set is going to consist of the supersingular j-invariants defined over Fp2 , Alice’s graph is
going to be made of `A-isogenies, while Bob is going to use `B-isogenies. Figure 15 shows a toy
example of such graphs, where p = 97, `A = 2 and `B = 3.
Even this, though, is not sufficient to define a key exchange protocol, because there is no
canonical way of labeling the edges of these graphs. We shall introduce, then, a very ad hoc
construction leveraging the group structure of elliptic curves. Recall that a separable isogeny is
uniquely defined by its kernel, and that in this case deg φ = # kerφ. More precisely, a walk of
length eA in the `A-isogeny graph corresponds to a kernel of size `eAA ; and this kernel is cyclic if
and only if the walk does not backtrack.
Hence, Alice choosing a secret walk of length eA is equivalent to her choosing a secret cyclic
subgroup 〈A〉 ⊂ E[`eAA ]. If we let Alice choose one such subgroup, and Bob choose similarly
a secret 〈B〉 ⊂ E[`eBB ], then there is a well defined subgroup 〈A〉 + 〈B〉 = 〈A,B〉, defining an
isogeny to E/〈A,B〉. Since we have taken care to choose `A 6= `B , the group 〈A,B〉 is cyclic of
order `eAA `
eB
B . This is illustrated in Figure 16.
At this point, we would like to define a protocol where Alice and Bob choose random cyclic
subgroups 〈A〉 and 〈B〉 in some large enough torsion groups, and exchange enough information
32
to both compute E/〈A,B〉 (up to isomorphism), without revealing their respective secrets. We
are faced with two difficulties, though:
1. The points of 〈A〉 (or 〈B〉) may not be rational. Indeed, in general they may be defined
over a field extension of degree as large as `eAA , thus requiring an exponential amount of
information to be explicitly represented.
2. The diagram in Figure 16 shows no way by which Alice and Bob could compute E/〈A,B〉
without revealing their secrets to each other.
We will solve both problems by carefully controlling the group structure of our supersingular
curves. This is something that is very hard to do in the ordinary case, but totally elementary in
the supersingular one, as the following proposition shows.
Theorem 54 (Group structure of supersingular curves). Let p be a prime, and let E be a
supersingular curve defined over a finite field Fq with q = pm elements. Let t be the trace of the
Frobenius endomorphism of E/k, then one of the following is true:
• m is odd and
– t = 0, or
– p = 2 and t2 = 2q, or
– p = 3 and t2 = 3q;
• m is even and
– t2 = 4q, or
– t2 = q, and j(E) = 0, and E is not isomorphic to y2 = x3 ± 1, or
– t2 = 0, and j(E) = 1728, and E is not isomorphic to y2 = x3 ± x.
The group structure of E(Fq) is one of the following:
• If t2 = q, 2q, 3q, then E(Fq) is cyclic;
• If t = 0, then E(Fq) is either cyclic, or isomorphic to Z/ q+12 Z⊕ Z/2Z;
• If t = ∓2√q, then E(Fq) ' (Z/(√q ± 1)Z)2.
Proof. See [77, 51].
Of all the cases, the only one we are concerned with is q = p2, and E(Fq) ' (Z/(p ± 1)Z)2.
Since we have full control on p, we can choose it so that E(Fq) contains two large subgroups
E[`eAA ] and E[`
eB
B ] of coprime order. Hence, once `
eA
A and `
eB
B are fixed, we look for a prime of
the form p = `eAA `
eB
B f ∓ 1, where f is a small cofactor. In practice, such primes are abundant,
and we can easily take f = 1. This solves the first problem: E(Fq) now contains `eA−1A (`A + 1)
cyclic subgroups of order `eAA , each defining a distinct isogeny; hence, a single point A ∈ E(Fq)
is enough to represent an isogeny walk of length eA.
The second problem is solved by a very peculiar trick, which sets SIDH apart from other
isogeny based protocols. The idea is to let Alice and Bob publish some additional information
to help each other compute the shared secret. Let us summarize what are the quantities known
to Alice and Bob. To set up the cryptosystem, they have publicly agreed on a prime p and a
supersingular curve E such that
E(Fp2) ' (Z/`eAA Z)2 ⊕ (Z/`eBB Z)2 ⊕ (Z/fZ)2.
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Public parameters Primes `A, `B , and a prime p = `eAA `
eB
B f ∓ 1,
A supersingular elliptic curve E over Fp2 of order (p± 1)2,
A basis 〈PA, QA〉 of E[`eAA ],
A basis 〈PB , QB〉 of E[`eBB ],
Alice Bob
Pick random secret A = [mA]PA + [nA]QA B = [mB ]PB + [nB ]QB
Compute secret isogeny α : E → EA = E/〈A〉 β : E → EB = E/〈B〉
Exchange data EA, α(PB), α(QB) −→ ←− EB , β(PA), β(QA)
Compute shared secret E/〈A,B〉 = EB/〈β(A)〉 E/〈A,B〉 = EA/〈α(B)〉
Figure 17: Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
It will be convenient to also fix public bases of their respective torsion groups:
E[`eAA ] = 〈PA, QA〉,
E[`eBB ] = 〈PB , QB〉.
To start the protocol, they choose random secret subgroups
〈A〉 = 〈[mA]PA + [nA]QA〉 ⊂ E[`eAA ],
〈B〉 = 〈[mB ]PB + [nB ]QB〉 ⊂ E[`eBB ],
of respective orders `eAA , `
eB
B , and compute the secret isogenies
α : E → E/〈A〉,
β : E → E/〈B〉.
They respectively publish EA = E/〈A〉 and EB = E/〈B〉.
Now, to compute the shared secret E/〈A,B〉, Alice needs to compute the isogeny α′ :
E/〈B〉 → E/〈A,B〉, which kernel is generated by β(A). We see that the kernel of α′ depends on
both secrets, thus Alice cannot compute it without Bob’s assistance. The trick here is for Bob
to publish the values β(PA) and β(QA): they do not require the knowledge of Alice’s secret, and
it is conjectured that they do not give any advantage in computing E/〈A,B〉 to an attacker.
From Bob’s published values, Alice can compute β(A) as [mA]β(PA) + [nA]β(QA), and complete
the protocol. Bob performs the analogous computation, with the help of Alice. The protocol is
summarized in Figure 17, and schematized in Figure 18.
We end with a discussion on parameter sizes. It is clear that the key space of SIDH depends
on the size of the subgroups E[`eAA ] and E[`
eB
B ], hence we must take `
eA
A ∼ `eBB so to make
attacks equally hard against Alice or Bob’s public data. However this puts serious constraints
on the isogeny walks performed in SIDH. Indeed, we have seen that the size of the supersingular
isogeny graph is O(p), whereas the size of Alice’s (or Bob’s) public key space is only O(√p). Said
otherwise, Alice and Bob take random walks much shorter than the diameter of the graph. At
the moment, it is not clear how this affects the security of the protocol.
To choose an appropriate size for p, we start by looking at attacks that only use the j-
invariants published by Alice and Bob. Given curves E and EA, connected by an isogeny of
degree `eAA , an easy variation on the meet-in-the-middle paradigm finds the secret isogeny in
O(`
eA/2
A ) steps (and O(`
eA/2
A ) storage) as follows: tabulate all possible walks of length beA/2c
starting from E, then iterate over the walks of length deA/2e starting from EA, until a collision
34
EE/〈A〉
α(PB)
α(QB)
E/〈B〉
β(PA)
β(QA)
E/〈A〉
α(B) ' E/〈A,B〉 ' E/〈B〉β(A)
α β
β′ α′
α(B) β(A)
Figure 18: Schematics of SIDH key exchange. Quantities only known to Alice are drawn in blue,
quantities only known to Bob in red.
is found. The same collision can also be found with O(`eA/3A ) queries to a quantum oracle, using
a quantum algorithm due to Tani [71]. Because the isogeny walks are shorter than the diameter,
we expect to find only one collision, and that is precisely Alice’s secret isogeny.
It turns out these are the best known attacks against SIDH, even taking into account the
additional information passed by Alice and Bob. Hence, taking log2 p = n offers a classical
security of ∼ n/4 bits, and a quantum security of ∼ n/6 qubits. In conclusion, to obtain a 128-
qubit and 192-bit secure system, we would have to find a 768-bit prime of the for p = `eAA `
eB
B f±1,
with eA log2 `A ∼ eB log2 `B ∼ 384. In practice, we usually take `A = 2 and `B = 3 for efficiency
reasons, and an example of one such prime is p = 23873242 − 1.
15 Further topics in isogeny based cryptography
We conclude these notes with a brief overview of the current research topics in isogeny based
cryptography. We only focus on constructions derived from supersingular isogenies, as they
currently are the most promising ones.
Efficient implementation of SIDH What makes SIDH interesting is its relatively good
efficiency, especially when compared with other isogeny based protocols. However, several opti-
mizations are required in order to achieve a compact and fast implementation, competitive with
other post-quantum key-exchange candidates. In short, one must optimize each of these levels:
• The arithmetic of Fp benefits from the special form of p, especially for primes of the form
p = 2a3b − 1, as explained in [12, 42, 6];
• The arithmetic of Fp2 benefits from the fact that −1 is not a square in Fp, whenever p = −1
mod 2;
• The arithmetic of elliptic curves benefits from using Montgomery models, and optimized
formulas for doublings, triplings, scalar multiplications and isogenies [22, 12, 10, 27];
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• Field inversions can be avoided using projective coordinates and projectivized curve equa-
tions [12];
• The full computation and evaluation of the secret isogeny from a generator of its kernel
must be performed using a quasi-linear algorithm first described in [22].
Undoubtedly, the latter is the most novel and surprising of the optimizations. For lack of
space, we do not describe any of them here, and we primarily address the interested reader to [22]
and [12].
By putting together all the optimizations mentioned above, the SIDH scheme can be made
relatively practical, as shown in [22, 12], although one or two orders of magnitude slower than
other post-quantum competitors. Where SIDH really excels, is in its very short key sizes, actually
the shortest among post-quantum candidates, at the time of writing. This key size can be shrunk
even more through key compression techniques [3, 11]. However, the size of the isogeny graph
in SIDH is much larger than the size of the key space, it is thus, in principle, possible to make
even shorter keys; how to do this efficiently is still an open question.
Security of SIDH We can formally state the security of SIDH as a hardness assumption on
a problem called SSDDH. As mentioned previously, the best known algorithms for SSDDH have
exponential complexity, even on a quantum computer.
Problem 6 (Supersingular Decision Diffie-Hellman). Let E, `A, `B , eA, eB , PA, QA, PB , QB be
the parameters of an SIDH protocol.
Given a tuple sampled with probability 1/2 from one of the following two distributions:
1. (E/〈A〉, φ(PB), φ(QB), E/〈B〉, ψ(PA), ψ(QA), E/〈A,B〉), where
• A ∈ E is a uniformly random point of order `eAA ,
• B ∈ E is a uniformly random point of order `eBB ,
• φ : E → E/〈A〉 is the isogeny of kernel 〈A〉, and
• ψ : E → E/〈B〉 is the isogeny of kernel 〈B〉;
2. (E/〈A〉, φ(PB), φ(QB), E/〈B〉, ψ(PA), ψ(QA), E/〈C〉), where A,B, φ, ψ are as above, and
where C ∈ E is a uniformly random point of order `eAA `eBB ;
determine from which distribution the tuple is sampled.
Assuming SSDDH is hard, we can formally prove the security of the key exchange against
passive adversaries, i.e., those adversaries who can see all messages sent between Alice and Bob,
but who do not modify them. We address the interested reader to [22] for the technical details.
It is apparent that SSDDH is a very special instance of the isogeny path problem; it is
thus conceivable that specially crafted algorithms could break SIDH without solving the generic
isogeny path problem. As an illustration, consider the following problem.
Problem 7. Let E, `A, `B , eA, eB , PA, QA, PB , QB be the parameters of an SIDH protocol.
Let A ∈ E be a point of order `eAA , and let φ : E → E/〈A〉. Given E/〈A〉, φ(PB) and φ(QB)
compute φ(R) for an arbitrary point R ∈ E of order `eAA .
It is easy to verify that solving this problem immediately reveals the secret 〈A〉. Indeed, φ(R)
is an element of ker φˆ, from which we can recover φˆ and φ, and thus 〈A〉. An efficient solution
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to this problem completely breaks SIDH, without doing anything for the generic isogeny path
problem.2
And indeed, although the security of SSDDH is still unblemished at the time of writing,
several polynomial-time attacks have appeared against variations of SIDH. The interested reader
will find more details in the following references:
• A key-recovery attack against a static key version of SIDH, where Alice uses a long term
secret isogeny [33];
• Key-recovery attacks in various leakage models [33, 36, 74];
• Key recovery attacks against some unbalanced variants of SIDH [56].
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is a quantum subexponential attack [5] in the case
where both E and E/〈A〉 are defined over Fp.
Other protocols Key exchange is not the only public-key protocol that can be derived from
isogeny graphs. It is easy, for example, to derive a public-key encryption protocol similar to El
Gamal from either the Rostovtsev-Stolbunov protocol or SIDH. We illustrate the second:
• Alice’s secret key is an isogeny α : E → E/〈A〉; her public key contains E/〈A〉 and the
evaluation of α on Bob’s basis 〈PB , QB〉.
• To encrypt a message m, Bob chooses a random β : E → E/〈B〉, and computes the shared
secret E/〈A,B〉, which he converts to a binary string s (e.g., by hashing the j invariant of
E/〈A,B〉); he sends to Alice the message (E/〈B〉, β(PA), β(QA),m⊕ s).
• To decrypt, Alice uses E/〈B〉, β(PA), β(QA) to compute the shared secret E/〈A,B〉, which
she converts to s, and finally she unmasks m⊕ s.
In [22], it is proven that this protocol is IND-CPA secure under the SSDDH assumption.
Achieving IND-CCA security is harder, as the attack against static keys in [33] shows, however
it is possible to apply a generic transformation to obtain an IND-CCA secure key encapsulation
mechanism.
One may expect that digital signatures would also generalize easily to the isogeny setting,
but both Schnorr signatures and ECDSA rely on the existence of a group law on the public data,
something that is missing both in the ordinary and in the supersingular case.
To our rescue, comes a zero-knowledge protocol based on the same construction shown in
Figure 16. In this protocol, Alice’s secret key is an isogeny α : E → E/〈A〉; her public key is
the curve E/〈A〉, together with a description of the action of α on E[`eBB ], as in SIDH. To prove
knowledge of α to Bob, she takes a random subgroup 〈B〉 ⊂ E[`eBB ], computes a commutative
diagram as in Figure 16, and sends to Bob the curves E/〈B〉 and E/〈A,B〉. To verify that Alice
knows the secret, Bob asks her one of two questions at random:
• either reveal the point B and its image α(B),
• or reveal the point β(A).
2The converse reduction is not evident either: given an oracle solving the isogeny path problem, how can we
break SIDH? A partial answer is given in [45, 33], where it is shown that, knowing the endomorphism rings of E
and E/〈A〉, an attacker can solve the isogeny path problem, and then break SIDH, in polynomial time.
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Parameters Primes `A, `B , and a prime p = `eAA `
eB
B f ∓ 1,
A supersingular elliptic curve E over Fp2 of order (p± 1)2,
A basis 〈PB , QB〉 of E[`eBB ].
Secret key An isogeny α : E → E/〈A〉 of degree `eAA .
Public key The curve E/〈A〉, the images α(PB), α(QB).
Alice Bob
Pick random B ∈ E[`eBB ] of order `eBB
Compute masking isogeny β : E → E/〈B〉
Commit (E/〈B〉, E/〈A,B〉) −→
Challenge ←− b ∈ {0, 1}
Reveal if b = 0, send (B,α(B))
if b = 1, send β(A) −→
Figure 19: Supersingular Isogeny Zero-Knowledge Identification protocol.
After receiving Alice’s answer, he accepts only if the points do define isogenies between the curves
E,E/〈A〉, E/〈B〉, E/〈A,B〉 as expected. The protocol is summarized in Figure 19.
Intuitively, if Alice respects the protocol, she always succeeds in convincing Bob. If she
cheats, she only has one chance out of two of guessing Bob’s challenge and succeed in tricking
him. Thus, by iterating the protocol a sufficient number of times, a cheater’s chance of success
can be made arbitrarily small at exponential pace. The protocol is zero-knowledge because
revealing B and α(B) does not reveal anything that Bob does not already know. Revealing β(A)
is trickier, and we need to make one more security assumption, named Decisional Supersingular
Product (DSSP), to prove zero knowledge. In [22] it is proven that this protocol is secure and
zero-knowledge under the SSDDH3 and DSSP assumptions.4
Using a generic construction, such as the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [28], it is possible to derive a
signature scheme from the zero-knowledge protocol above. Alternative signature schemes based
on the same construction, with different desirable properties, are presented in [34, 78]. However,
all these protocols suffer from the high cost of having to iterate hundreds of times the basic
building block of Figure 19. Obtaining an efficient signature scheme from isogeny assumptions
is still an open problem.
More protocols can be obtained by slightly generalizing the SIDH construction. If we allow
the prime to be of the form p = `eAA `
eB
B `
eC
C ± 1, we can construct a commutative cube in the
same way the square of Figure 16 was constructed. Using primes of this form, Sun, Tian and
Wang have proposed a strong designated verifier signature scheme [69]. Adding one more prime
`D in the mix, Jao and Soukharev have proposed undeniable signatures [40]. The drawback of
all these schemes is that, as we add more torsion subgroups to the base curve, the size of the
primes grows, making the schemes less and less practical.
In general, isogeny graphs are much less flexible than the classical discrete logarithm problem.
Many of the protocols that have been built on discrete logarithms fail to be ported to isogeny
based cryptography. Devising new post-quantum protocols, retaining some of the desirable
properties of classical ones, is a very active area of research in isogeny based cryptography.
3Actually, a weaker assumption named CSSI.
4The paper [22] also hints at a variant of the zero-knowledge protocol where Bob challenges Alice to open one
out of three commitments, namely one of B,α(B), β(A). This variant is less efficient, since a cheater has 2/3
chances of success, however its security relies on the stronger isogeny walk problem, rather than on SSDDH.
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Exercices
Exercice III.1. Prove Proposition 40.
Exercice III.2. Show that a Schreier graph (S ⊂ G,X) is an ε-expander if and only if S
generates G.
Exercice III.3. Derive encryption protocols à la El Gamal from the key exchange protocols of
Section 14.
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